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Abstract 
In this paper, we argue that managerial entrenchment may be positive when 
there is excessive external pressure from financial markets. In these situations, 
managers have more freedom to implement value-enhancing strategies, such those 
related to corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. This is a good-type of 
entrenchment. On the other hand, when the external pressure is not so high, given that 
the pressure is from inside the firm, managerial entrenchment is bad and the use of CSR 
investments may exacerbate the agency problem. We prove this claim in an empirical 
study conducted of 279 international firms that operate in 22 different countries for the 
period 2002-2005. These firms participate in two different institutional contexts: that of 
the Anglo-Saxon countries, where the pressure of financial markets is intensive, or that 
of the Continental European countries in which the corporate control mechanisms are 
mainly internal. 
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Traditionally, managerial entrenchment has been considered to be one of the 
costliest manifestations of agency problems (Jensen & Ruback, 1983). Managers, who 
obtain substantial private benefits from being in control and yet are only responsible for 
a small amount of its associated costs, are able to pursue costly entrenchment strategies 
in order to keep their positions, even when they are not sufficiently competent or 
qualified to manage a company (Shleifer & Vishny, 1989). There is a variety of 
entrenchment practices that managers may employ (Walsh and Seward, 1990), such as 
poison pills, supermajority amendments, anti-takeover devices, or the so-called golden 
parachutes (Dahya et al., 1998; De Miguel et al., 2004; Denis et al., 1997; Morck et al. 
1988; Stulz, 1988). Maintaining such managers in these positions leads to an 
expropriation of investor wealth or an inadequate assignment of company resources 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
However, some researchers (e.g., Sundaramurthy, 2000) have indicated that 
there are some circumstances where management entrenchment may lead to an 
improvement in company results or, at the least, may do nothing to harm them. Within 
the context of a highly active capital market centered on short-term returns, the adoption 
of entrenchment practices would generate a type of long-term contract; this would 
enable management to feel more protected in order to carry out specific investments 
whose returns occur over a longer period of time. Also, Rajan and Wulf (2006) argued 
that managerial perks, which are generally related to the implementation of managerial 
entrenchment strategies, may have positive effects on managerial productivity and 
which, in turn, may improve financial performance. 
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Taking these differing perspectives into account, the present study analyzes the 
relationship between management entrenchment, creation of value for the shareholders 
and a very specific type of investment, that of corporate social responsibility. Corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) may play a role in both of the following cases: when 
managerial entrenchment is positive and also when it has negative consequences for a 
firm’s performance. 
On the positive side, in those environments in which firms suffer substantial 
pressure from the outside (e.g., in Anglo-Saxon countries), managers may implement 
entrenchment strategies not only for their short-term survival but also to be able to 
invest in value-enhancing long-term projects. In most cases, the development of these 
projects requires that stakeholders’ specific investments be stimulated by means of CSR 
activities. Within this context, the protection provided by anti-takeover devices and 
other entrenchment mechanisms gives the manager enough slack to implement these 
social activities (McGuire et al., 2003). It is through such social activities that a group 
of intangible assets are generated and, with them, financial performance will increase 
(Waddock & Graves, 1997). 
On the negative side, when the pressure from external (market) corporate 
governance mechanisms is less intense, managerial entrenchment does not serve to 
correct a high-pressure situation; in this context, managers do not need to establish a 
minimum of flexibility to determine optimal investment strategies. In a low-external 
pressure framework, managerial entrenchment only pursues managerial survival as an 
objective in itself. In such a context, CSR activities only reinforce the negative aspects 
of managerial entrenchment and, in fact, CSR is an integral part of the manager-
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designed entrenchment strategy (Surroca & Tribó, 2008). This is so because when 
external market mechanisms are less developed (e.g, in Continental Europe), traditional 
entrenchment mechanisms such as anti-takeover devices are useless and entrenched 
managers seek out alternative mechanisms. One of these alternatives is to gain collusion 
with stakeholders by means of implementing a CSR-intensive policy (Cespa & Cestone, 
2004; Pagano & Volpin, 2005). There are two arguments that justify these socially 
responsible practices. Firstly, interest groups may accumulate sufficient power to 
promote or boycott a manager (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1998; Hellwig, 2000; Rowley 
and Berman, 2000). Secondly, through a generous policy of concessions towards these 
interest groups, management is making the company less attractive to potential buyers, 
as contracts established between workers and providers may not be rescindable in the 
short-term (Pagano and Volpin, 2005). 
Moreover, Cespa and Cestone (2004) stated that entrenchment practices 
involving the satisfaction of stakeholders’ interests will be more likely when 
stakeholder protection is more developed and when stakeholders have accumulated 
substantial power due to the lack of pressure from financial markets. In contrast to 
Anglo-Saxon countries, such situations commonly occur in Continental Europe.  
This study departs from the previous dichotomy of managerial entrenchment and 
shows empirically that in some situations –when external corporate governance is well 
developed– managerial entrenchment is positive and may be connected to the 
implementation of CSR activities that generate value. The usual mechanisms of 
entrenchment in the Anglo-Saxon model are enough to isolate the manager from the 
pressure from the external mechanisms of governance. As a result, concessions made 
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towards stakeholders are considered to be a long-term investment with positive effects 
upon the company’s results. On the other hand, when external pressure is less intense 
(as is the case of Continental Europe), corporate control relies on internal mechanisms, 
including stakeholder activism. In this case, entrenchment strategies of collusion with 
stakeholders (CSR activities) are implemented in order to reduce the efficiency of 
internal control mechanisms. This in turn has a negative effect on financial 
performance. 
In order to demonstrate this theoretical argument, this study has drawn upon an 
international database provided by the Sustainable Investment Research International 
(SiRi) Company, an international network of research institutions dedicated to social 
and environmental scrutiny of the most important companies in the world. The data 
includes and expands upon information supplied by the Kinder, Lyndemberg, Domini, 
and Company (KLD) that has been already extensively used in previous literature (Agle 
et al., 1999; Berman et al., 1999; Hillman & Keim, 2001; Waddock & Graves, 1997). 
The final sample includes a total of 717 companies from 27 different countries, which 
makes it representative of different institutional contexts. As has been argued, such 
contexts play an important part in shaping the relationships between corporate 
governance and corporate social responsibility (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Schneper & 
Guillén, 2004).  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
As argued by Shliefer and Vishny (1997), a good governance structure is one 
which is able to align the interests of both principals and agents. In this sense, several 
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mechanisms can force agents to interiorize the interests of the principal; mechanisms 
that are classified according to their internal or external nature. Internal mechanisms are 
managerial incentives, such as stock options or other performance-based payment 
schemes, or control structures such as the presence of institutional shareholders, the 
presence of outsiders in the board of directors or the existence of committees for 
auditing, remuneration, and nomination. On the other hand, the market for corporate 
control, and competition in the product and management job markets, are all examples 
of what are known as external governance mechanisms. 
Building upon this classification of governance mechanisms, in most 
international comparisons, researchers contrasted two dichotomous models of corporate 
governance, depending on which of the two competing sets of mechanisms –internal or 
external– prevail in each institutional context (La Porta et al., 1998). The Anglo-Saxon 
model, sometimes labeled as outsider, market-oriented, or shareholder-centered model, 
relies primarily on external (market) mechanisms of governance; while internal 
mechanisms are of critical importance to reduce agency problems in the insider, bank-
oriented, or stakeholder-centered model of Continental Europe and Japan. In explaining 
these differences in corporate governance practices across national boundaries and why 
certain practices are more widely spread in some countries than in others, some authors 
have relied on institutional elements. From La Porta and colleagues’ (1998) study, it is 
well-known that the relative importance of each type of control mechanism depends on 
the institutional context in which the company belongs. As a result, countries which 
emphasize the protection of shareholders’ rights will base company control on external 
governance mechanisms such as the market for corporate control. In contrast, countries 
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that give more protection to other groups such as workers or creditors will base such 
control on internal mechanisms. In both cases, however, the need for governance 
mechanisms grows greater as the proportion of managerial ownership becomes smaller; 
because the costs of bad or opportunistic decisions are not fully internalized by the 
manager. In these circumstances, the two alternative models of governance –the market 
or outsider model of Anglo-Saxon countries and the insider model of European 
countries and Japan– propose two alternative responses to the agency problem. In the 
first model, takeover bids play a leading role, while in the second model, banks and 
other institutional shareholders, as well as the concentration of ownership and 
stakeholder activism, are the most effective mechanisms to discipline managers 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). We summarize the main differences between both systems 
in Table 1. 
---------------------------------------- 
Table 1 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
Acknowledging these differences in institutional frameworks and in the 
pressures exerted on managers, in this study we investigate whether managerial 
entrenchment is always bad. As we will argue, a key element to answer this question is 
CSR.  
Managerial Entrenchment and CSR in Outsider Models of Corporate Governance 
Managerial control from outside is mainly achieved via takeover bids. When 
managers do not create enough value, the price of the shares goes down and the 
company is likely to be taken over. The result of this process is that managers are fired 
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even when they are not fully responsible for the decrease in prices, or simply because 
the decrease in prices is the result of investing in a long-term project that does not create 
enough value in the short-term. By the same token, an increasing proportion of takeover 
bids are made for young companies with good growth perspectives and which have not 
fully capitalized the value they expected to generate in the first stages of development. 
In this situation, the managerial adoption of entrenchment initiatives may be socially 
optimal (Walsh & Seward, 1990). 
Obviously, the likelihood of being fired is negatively related to managerial 
ownership (a proxy of managerial power). When managers are also owners, they 
assume part of the costs of poor decisions and opportunistic behaviours, and thus will 
avoid activities that destroy value (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). By increasing their 
participation in the ownership of the firm, managers are less dependent on entrenchment 
activities to retain their positions. A rise in managerial ownership may not always 
increase shareholder wealth, however. Managers may increase their participation until 
they are capable of dominating the board of directors, thus protecting themselves from 
internal and external control (Fama & Jensen, 1983). In a similar fashion, Morck et al 
(1988) and De Miguel et al (2004) argued that entrenchment occurs at intermediate 
levels of managerial ownership. Below the lower bound, supervision of management is 
so intense that there is no possibility of entrenchment. Above the higher bound, 
managers internalize the costs of entrenchment and thus take steps to avoid malpractice. 
Companies that are pressured from outside are generally those in which 
managerial ownership is low. In these companies, managers have different mechanisms 
for implementing an entrenchment strategy (Denis et al., 1997; Dahya et al, 1998). The 
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limitation of voting rights in certain types of shares, the repurchase of large blocks of 
shares without shareholder approval, poison pills, the issue of different types of shares, 
carrying out certain types of acquisitions and disinvestments, supermajority 
amendments, or golden parachutes are some of the mechanisms usually employed by 
managers to avoid the intense supervision of capital markets. What is more, in some 
cases, these practices reduce the efficiency of the control mechanisms to the extent that 
the cost of carrying out a takeover may be greater than the benefits obtained by a 
successful bidder.  
As some authors have suggested (e.g., Kochhar & David, 1996), the most active 
agents in the capital market –particularly in the Anglo-Saxon countries– are myopic. 
Thus, they tend to value short-term more than long-term returns. Institutional investors, 
who play an important role in hostile takeover bids, rarely have access to the internal 
information of a company and, as such, have difficulty in calculating the long-term 
value of a company as well as the quality of the managerial team. Instead, they tend to 
focus on more easily quantifiable methods of measuring performance such as 
accounting profits. Moreover, investment fund managers are themselves subject to the 
problem of short-termism and their behaviour is evaluated by their own investors 
yearly. As a result of this myopic behaviour, managers pressured from capital markets 
tend to favour projects with certain returns in the short term and rule out riskier projects 
with longer recovery periods and higher present value (Hoskisson et al., 2002).  
Taking into account the markets’ myopia, some researchers have suggested that 
anti-takeover devices are contracts that protect management against takeovers. 
Entrenchment allows managers to focus on long-term strategic decisions, without the 
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threat of losing control of the company or even their own jobs (Jonson & Rao, 1997). 
As such, entrenchment reduces myopic decisions that management would take when 
they are under pressure from the market for corporate control. 
Anti-takeover devices allow managers to invest in projects that yield long-term 
returns, such as those activities that a company develops to create good relationships 
with its stakeholders or CSR. There is vast literature that argues that the investment in 
CSR helps to generate intangible assets that lead to a more effective use of company 
resources, which has a positive impact on financial performance (Hillman and Keim, 
2001). In spite of this positive association between CSR and financial performance, 
many managers find themselves under pressure to obtain immediate results and, 
therefore, abandon social programs that offer long-term returns (Waddock and Graves, 
1997).  
Outside pressures may lead managers to break the implicit contract between the 
firm and its stakeholders. Anticipating this behavior, stakeholders are less willing to 
make the kind of specific investments that generate value-enhancing intangible 
resources. In this scenario, an entrenchment strategy may provide credibility and 
consistency to the CSR strategy and, may generate improvements in a firm’s financial 
performance. Therefore, the development of CSR activities is a signal that managerial 
entrenchment is attempting to generate value. Hence, in this case we have an example of 
a good-type of entrenchment. 
The institutional framework of Anglo-Saxon countries is an example of pressure 
from external control mechanisms. In these countries, as shown in Table 1, there is 
greater legal protection for investors, less presence of large investors, share ownership is 
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more diluted among small investors, and large companies issue debt to the capital 
market in order to raise capital. We thus expect that in this institutional framework 
managerial entrenchment will trigger CSR activities and that their combined effect on 
financial performance will be positive. This is our first hypothesis to be tested:  
 
Hypothesis 1: In firms that are subject to external control pressure, like those in 
Anglo-Saxon countries, managerial entrenchment will trigger CSR. The 
combined effect of CSR and entrenchment on financial performance will be 
positive. 
Managerial entrenchment and CSR in Insider Models of Corporate Governance 
When the control of managers is made from inside the firm, the composition of 
the board of directors, the existence of different subcommittees or the presence of large 
shareholders (blockholders) like families or banks play a pivotal role in the control of 
managers. In the absence of significant external pressure from financial markets, these 
mechanisms are effective ways of controlling managers and prevent the eventual 
negative effect of managerial entrenchment on firm value (Walsh & Seward, 1990; 
Sundaramurthy et al., 1997; Sundaramurthy, 2000). 
Among the different internal mechanisms, blockholders have incentives to 
gather information and monitor the manager, and as a result, have the power to reduce 
agency costs and hinder managerial entrenchment (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). The inside 
information obtained by blockholders has two consequences: first, it provides them with 
good knowledge of managerial quality. Second, it enables blockholders to adopt a more 
long-term perspective in their investment decisions. Hence, controlling shareholders 
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will rarely force managerial replacement when a good-quality manager has not 
generated enough short-term value. In this context, the response of managerial 
entrenchment is an inefficient strategy from a social point of view and can rarely be 
justified in terms of seeking stability in order to implement long-term strategies that, 
eventually, will involve different stakeholders. In fact, contrary to what we argued in the 
external corporate control scenario, the implementation of CSR activities as part of an 
entrenchment strategy is now a signal that managerial entrenchment is bad and destroys 
value. 
Managers that want to implement an entrenchment strategy need to find internal 
allies and gain their support through generous social concessions. This is because 
traditional entrenchment measures like poison pills, anti-takeover devices or golden 
parachutes are not effective in an internal corporate control setting. Workers or 
consumers are natural allies against the interests of shareholders and potential buyers 
(Cespa and Cestone, 2004). When managers are in risk of replacement, they may 
implement expensive policies aimed at improving firm’s CSR. Hellwig (2000) or 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1998) provided examples of managers, in their search to 
escape investor pressure, find allies in sectors such as the political system, the media, 
the legal system, the workers or universities. Obviously, the greater the power that these 
same groups have, the greater the advantages offered by their support. As Schneper and 
Guillén (2004) argued, in countries where there are internal control mechanisms, 
stakeholders such as workers, creditors or public authorities have a great capacity to 
influence business decisions, including the decision to replace a firm’s CEO.  
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At the same time, expensive social programs to satisfy stakeholders make 
companies less attractive to possible buyers. Generous long-term contracts with workers 
and suppliers, as well as long-term commitments to support social and environmental 
organizations are difficult to revoke (Pagano & Volpin, 2005).  
In short, the implementation of an intensive CSR policy leads to a reduction in 
stakeholder activism, which is also a component of a firm’s internal control 
mechanisms, and makes a firm less attractive to potential external buyers. Both 
consequences reinforce managerial positions against pressure from internal corporate 
control mechanisms. In this respect, the implementation of CSR policies is an integral 
part of an entrenchment strategy that is aimed at destroying shareholder value (Surroca 
& Tribó, 2008). We have here an example of the bad-type of entrenchment. 
These types of concessions to stakeholders which are linked to an entrenchment 
strategy are what McWilliams and Siegel (2001) defined as “discretional CSR”. As 
such, these concessions are not justified by their strategic nature but rather by the 
specific objective of remaining in a job position. Therefore, the use of discretional CSR 
by managers is negatively related to financial performance. 
As suggested (and shown in Table 1), the Continental European model of 
governance –in which capital markets have a very limited function– emphasizes internal 
control mechanisms. The threat of a hostile takeover is almost anecdotal and pressure 
from share prices is limited by the reduced liquidity and transparency of the capital 
market. Instead, large shareholders, families and banks play an important part in 
supervising management. Thus, the Continental institutional framework is a corporate 
governance model where pressures to control managers are originated inside the firm. In 
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this context, managerial entrenchment may trigger CSR policies, and this may in turn, 
negatively affect financial performance. This is our second hypothesis to be tested: 
 
Hypothesis 2: In firms that are subject to internal control pressures, like those 
in Continental Europe and Japan, managerial entrenchment may trigger CSR. 
The combined effect of CSR and entrenchment on financial performance will be 
negative. 
METHODS 
Sample 
In order to test our hypotheses, we used a sample made up of 279 industrial 
companies from 22 different countries. These companies have been included, for at least 
one year, in the 2002-05 SiRi Pro
TM 
database. These data are compiled by the 
Sustainable Investment Research International Company (SiRi), one of the most 
important international organizations in the study of socially responsible investment. 
SiRi is made up of eleven different independent research institutions such as KLD 
Research Analytics in the USA and Centre Info in Switzerland. Together, these 
institutions carry out detailed profiles of the main corporations in the world, and analyze 
them on the basis of their informative procedures, their policies and guidelines, 
management systems and other data of interest. Basically, the information is extracted 
from financial accounts, documentation provided by the company, international 
databases, and media reports, interviews with the principal interest groups and from 
permanent contact with company managers. 
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A company is thus evaluated according to 199 points of information that cover 
the main stakeholder groups, such as community, customers, employees, corporate 
governance, suppliers, and environment. We complement these data on corporate 
responsibility with data on financial and ownership structure that is extracted from 
OSIRIS. This is a database compiled by Bureau van Dijk (BvD) that provides 
information on financial, ownership and earnings for 38,000 companies, including 
listed, unlisted and de-listed companies from over 130 countries. 
Variables  
Corporate Social Responsability (CSR). Previous literature has recognized the 
difficulty of measuring this variable (Aupperle et al., 1985). As a multi-dimensional 
construct (Carroll, 1979) it captures a broad range of dimensions; one for each relevant 
stakeholder group (Waddock & Graves, 1997). Until relatively recently, many studies 
have approached CSR via information regarding just one stakeholder (Wood & Jones, 
1995). However, with the KLD data, this problem has been resolved and there are now 
many studies that employ the information provided by this North American institution 
(for example, Hillman & Keim, 2001; Berman et al., 1999; Waddock & Graves, 1997). 
This study uses the SiRi PRO
TM 
database, which includes dimensions similar to those 
provided by the KLD database. Five of these dimensions measure the level of company 
responsibility towards its stakeholders: community, consumers, employees, the 
environment, and suppliers. Other sections provide a summary of company 
management practices. Each one of the items included in each of the dimensions is 
separately evaluated and assigned a rating between 0 (the worst evaluation) and 100 (the 
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best evaluation). Importantly, each information item is weighted according to a 
methodology developed by SiRi. These weights are sector-specific and are developed 
annually. For each sector, SiRi’s analysts determine the firm’s potential negative impact on 
each stakeholder and assign a weight in proportion to this potential. For example, the 
“environment” is weighted more heavily for energy companies than it is for companies in the 
banking industry. The final score provided by SiRi is the sum of each of the scores of the 199 
items averaged by its corresponding weight and rated on a scale from 0 (worst) to 100 (best).  
Financial performance. This variable has been approached by means of 
Tobin’s q, which is obtained by dividing the sum of the company’s market value, long-
term debts, current liabilities for the book value of inventories, property, plants and 
equipment (see Cheng & Pruitt, 1995; this approach has also been used by Dowell et al., 
2000, and King & Lenox , 2002 ). Both studies highlight the advantages of Tobin’s q 
with regard to using accounting measures for results; these advantages include its 
greater capacity to capture long-term value of investments such as intangible assets 
(Dowell et al., 2000).  
Managerial entrenchment. As has been noted in the theoretical section, 
managers that try to isolate themselves from the control of external governance 
mechanisms may attempt to pursue different entrenchment strategies. In this study, 
different measures –provided by the SiRi PRO
TM 
database– have been employed: 1) the 
existence of anti-takeover measures; 2) limits on the shareholders’ voting rights; 3) the 
existence of different types of shares with different voting rights; 4) manager-controlled 
ownership; and 5) managerial tenure. 
 17 
 
 
Anti- takeover measures: this is a dummy variable that is given the value 1 if the 
company has implemented one of the following measures: the creation of voting caps, 
the increase of voting rights over time, the restriction on board members’ right to 
election, and ‘poison pills’.  
Voting rights amendments: a dummy variable where the value 1 corresponds to 
the situation in which important controversies occur and have a negative impact upon 
the shareholders’ rights (these may include internal scandals that affect managers or 
conflict of interests between board members). The value 0 indicates that the analysts at 
SiRi have not found any controversy that might affect the shareholder. 
Dual-class shares: this is a dummy variable that has value 1 if the company has 
multiple types of shares with different voting rights. 
Managerial ownership: Stulz (1988) demonstrated that high levels of managerial 
ownership could prevent hostile takeover bids. Similarly, Weston (1979) emphasized 
that companies that had over 30% of internal ownership would never be acquired via a 
hostile takeover. Conforming to the previous proposals, Morck et al (1988), McConnel 
and Servaes (1990) and De Miguel et al. (2004) have found the existence of a non-linear 
relationship between management ownership and company performance, where 
entrenchment appears at intermediate levels of ownership. Adopting this perspective, 
the current study follows the proposals made by De Miguel et al. (2004) and thus 
estimates Tobin’s q as related to management ownership (as well as its quadratic and 
cubic terms). Size, leverage and investment have been used as controls (defined below). 
Results show that the relation between Tobin’s q and management ownership decreases 
in the range between 17% and 69%. Management ownership is thus a dichotomic 
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variable that takes the value 1 when the level of ownership under management control 
falls within this range. 
Managerial tenure: Fredrickson et al (1988) show that a substantial amount of 
executive directors have a maximum tenure of 3 years. As a result, when this upper 
limit is passed, managers are likely to employ a strategy of entrenchment. This is why 
managerial tenure is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the tenure of the 
manager’s position is greater than 3 years and it takes the value of 0 when it is less than 
3 years.  
Managerial entrenchment: further to the previous partial measures, a global 
measurement of entrenchment has been generated that consists of the sum of the 
previous 5 indicators. 
Controls. There are two groups of control variables included in our empirical 
models: variables that reflect how internal governance mechanisms work as well as 
other variables of control, such as financial structure, dividends, size and age of the 
company, capital intensity, growth opportunities, the industry, the country and the year 
in question.  
Internal corporate control mechanisms: different measurements have been used 
to approach the strength of internal mechanisms; 1) the degree of board independence; 
2) separation between the CEO and the chairman of the board; 3) the existence of board 
subcommittees; 4)the existence of a system to evaluate managers’ results; and 5) the 
presence of large shareholders. 
Board independence is a Likert-type scale provided by SiRi that takes three 
possible values contingent on the percentage of independent directors with respect to the 
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mean value of the sector. The highest value corresponds to the situation in which a 
majority of non-executive directors are considered independent; the intermediate value 
indicates that 50% or less of non-executive directors are independent; and when the 
information disclosed by the company does not allow us to determine the share of 
independent non-executive directors, the firm receives the lowest value. CEO’s non-
duality is a dichotomic variable from SiRi that takes the value 1 when the chairman of 
the board is not the CEO of the company. The variable Board subcommittees is a 
Likert-type scale that may take 4 different values: 3 means that the company has an 
auditing committee, a remuneration committee and a nomination committee: 0 
represents the lack of any one of these subcommittees. The intermediate values indicate 
the number of existing subcommittees within the company. 
The Performance evaluation variable takes three values according to the SiRi 
classification: it takes the value 1 when the board has a performance evaluation system 
and there are no controversies identified with regard to executive salaries (such as the 
existence of salaries unrelated to results, golden parachutes, changes in prices of stock 
options, or excesses in the pension-fund packages for managers). The variable takes the 
value 0 when one of these two conditions is not satisfied and takes -1 when none of the 
two are satisfied. 
Another internal control mechanism is the role played by large shareholders 
(blockholders). This study incorporates this factor by means of two measurements: State 
ownership, which is the percentage of government-controlled ownership, and 
Ownership concentration, which is measured by the sum of participation of the three 
largest blockholders (excluding managers). 
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Other control variables. In order to control for the financial structure, the 
variable Leverage is defined as the ratio of total liabilities to shareholders funds. ROA is 
the ratio of earnings before interest and tax to total value of assets. The variable 
Dividends identify the company’s compensation policy. Growth is approached through 
the sales rate. Size has been defined by the natural logarithm of assets, and Age is the 
number of years a company has existed. The variable Capital intensity is the ratio of 
fixed assets to total assets; in similar way, the variable Intangibles is the proportion of 
intangible assets to total assets. In addition, temporal and sectorial dummy variables 
have been incorporated into the empirical models. Lastly, four types of countries have 
been identified according to the classification made by La Porta and others (1998); this 
is made according to whether the rules governing the development of business activity 
are British, French, German or Scandinavian. These variables will be the proxies for the 
pressure from external control mechanisms. Consistently with our theoretical 
contentions, firms in Anglo-Saxon countries are controlled through external 
mechanisms while firms in Continental Europe and Japan are controlled through 
internal mechanisms. 
Empirical analysis 
In order to test our hypotheses, we estimated two models by conducting robust 
regressions, clustering the error terms at a firm level. The first model explains CSR 
while the second explains financial performance. The first model is: 
 
CSRi t +1 =α 1 + α 2 Managerial entrenchment it + α 3 Board independence it + α 4 CEO non-
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duality  it + α 5 Board subcommitees it + α 6 Performance evaluation it + α 7 State 
ownership it + α 8 Ownership concentration it + α 9 Leverage it + α 10 ROA it + 
α 11 Dividends it + α 12 Growthit + α 13 Sizeit + α 14 Age it + α 15 Capital Intensityit 
+α 16 Intangibles it + ε it                                                                                                                               (1) 
 
The previous model also incorporates temporal and sectorial dummy variables. 
The estimation was carried out in differences (fixed-effects estimation) in order to 
eliminate the unobservable heterogeneity that might be potentially correlated with 
independent variables. For example, managers’ specific characteristics could condition 
the company’s policy of social concessions, as well as the implementation of 
entrenchment activities that, eventually, could affect the characteristics of corporate 
control mechanisms. Also, we lead the dependent variable by one period to tackle the 
potential problem of reverse causality in the estimations. 
The second model attempts to explain financial performance using the following 
equation (that also includes temporal and sectorial dummy variables): 
 
Tobin’s q i t +1 =β 1 + β 2 Managerial entrenchment it + β 3 CSR + β 4 CSR × Managerial entrenchment 
+ β 5 Board independence it + β 6 CEO non-duality it + β 7 Board subcommittees it +  
β 8 Performance evaluation it + β 9 State ownership it +  
β 10 Ownership concentration it + β 11 Leverage it + β 12 Dividends it +  
β 13 Growth it + β 14 Size it + β 15 Age it + β 16 Capital intensityit +  
β 17 Intangibles it + θ it                                                                                                                                             (2) 
 
By using both models it is possible to test the above hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 is 
supported when, using the sub-sample of companies belonging to the Anglo-Saxon 
model, the coefficient α 2 is positive and significant in specification (1) and, at the same 
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time, the coefficient β4 is also positive and significant is specification (2). Likewise, 
Hypothesis 2 has support when, in the sub-sample of companies belonging to the 
Continental model, the coefficient α 2 is positive and significant in specification (1) and, 
at the same time, the coefficient β4 is negative and significant in specification (2).  
RESULTS 
Tables 2 and 3 report descriptive statistics and Pearson’s correlations for all 
variables. From the correlations’ matrix, we observe a positive and significant 
correlation between managerial entrenchment and CSR. More specifically, it can be 
observed that the CSR is positively related to anti-takeover measures, with a 
deterioration of shareholders’ rights and with changes in management ownership. It is 
important to mention the fact that satisfaction of stakeholder groups is also negatively 
correlated to different internal control mechanisms such as the existence of independent 
committees for auditing/compensation/nomination, or the implementation of 
performance-based payment schemes. Debt levels and dividends also hinder 
concessions to interest groups. These results thus provide preliminary evidence of the 
existence of a relationship between managerial entrenchment and CSR. Also, internal 
control mechanisms attempt to eliminate such practices because, in this context, 
entrenchment is negative. In the following tables these relationships are analyzed in 
greater detail. 
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---------------------------------------- 
Tables 2 and 3 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
The results of equation 1 are summarized in Table 4, which attempts to explain 
the effect of entrenchment on CSR for each institutional context that proxies for the 
different corporate control mechanisms.  
---------------------------------------- 
Table 4 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
Figures of Table 4 reveal that variations in entrenchment have a positive impact 
on the CSR of the subsequent period; this is the case with both the Anglo-Saxon model 
of governance based on external control mechanisms (column 2) and the Continental 
model that relies on internal control mechanisms (column 4). Moving on to examine the 
details of the factors that explain CSR in each model of governance, the following can 
be observed: for those firms that suffer external pressure (the Anglo-Saxon model), it 
can be seen that anti-takeover measures, voting rights constraints, the existence of 
different class actions and managerial tenure, all have a positive and significant effect 
on CSR. Particularly relevant is the impact of anti-takeover measures upon CSR –a 
mechanism that is gaining increasing importance in the British and North American 
contexts. On the other hand, the lack of significance of the managerial ownership 
variable suggests that a powerful manager (with a significant stake) pursues his own 
private benefits even at the expense of stakeholders’ interests. This is the second agency 
problem of expropriation by significant shareholders.  
As regards the influence of internal governance mechanisms, it can be observed 
that financially-based incentive schemes serve to impede the activities of CSR. With 
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respect to the remaining controls, it can be seen that CSR is explained by dividend 
policy, which has a negative influence; and that growth opportunities and the existence 
of intangibles both have a positive effect. These results suggest that a generous dividend 
policy impedes the implementation of socially responsible practices (firms have less 
financial slack to satisfy stakeholders’ interests), whilst the positive influence of growth 
and intangibles is consistent with previous findings in the stakeholder literature. 
When we focus on those firms that are internally controlled (firms from 
Continental Europe; columns 3 and 4), we do find that anti-takeover measures, such as 
managerial ownership, have a positive impact on CSR. We argue that these are 
measures that are closely related to managerial discretion, differently to other 
entrenchment mechanisms that need the approval of different agents in the firm. 
Managers, then, have some leeway to implement anti-takeover devices and to change 
their own stake. As part of their entrenchment strategy, they complement the change of 
such variables with the implementation of a CSR intensive policy. Regarding internal 
governance mechanisms, CSR practices are impeded by both incentive systems and the 
existence of independent sub-committees for auditing, remuneration and nomination. 
The opposite result is found when the State is a shareholder: stake ownership leads 
companies to set up social and environmental projects. We can argue that the State may 
be less interested in preventing entrenchment practices if they are associated with 
improvements in stakeholders’ satisfaction, principally workers and customers.  
Finally, in respect to controls, results show that the dividend policy reduces the 
availability of resources to carry out CSR activities, while companies that grow and 
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invest in intangibles require active participation from interest groups and, for that 
reason, undertake CSR activities.  
In resume, results of Table 4 suggest that, independently of whether the 
corporate control is external or internal, managerial entrenchment triggers CSR 
activities.  
Equation 2, whose results are depicted in Table 5, explores the ex-post 
consequences of combining managerial entrenchment with implementation of CSR 
activities. With that, we may explain the reasons that lead managers to foster CSR. 
---------------------------------------- 
Table 5 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
Results of Table 5 correspond to the use of Tobin q (lead by one period) as a 
proxy of performance. The use of alternatives proxies such as ROA provides consistent 
results. In this Table, the main variable to be analyzed measures the combined effect of 
entrenchment and CSR, and is indicated by the multiplicative variable CSR × 
Entrenchment. As can be observed, the effect of this variable depends on the control 
model analyzed. In the outsider model, CSR practices fostered by an entrenchment 
strategy have a positive effect on Tobin’s q. This result, combined with the positive 
influence of entrenchment on CSR, provides empirical support to our Hypothesis 1.  
When we focus on the scenario of internal corporate control mechanism (column 
2), the CSR that follows an entrenchment strategy has a negative effect on financial 
performance. Such evidence further supports our Hypothesis 2. Also, as with the 
previous model, entrenchment itself only has a negative effect on Tobin’s q.  
Considered together, these results show that CSR serves as strategy to enforce 
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managerial entrenchment, specifically in those contexts where stakeholder activism may 
play a more important role in motivating or impeding manager replacement. On the 
other hand, in those institutional contexts where the capital market plays an active role, 
stakeholders have very little legal protection (and by extension, little influence in the 
corporate governance). When managers isolate themselves from the threat of hostile 
takeovers (by means of anti-takeover measures), their reasons for carrying out socially 
responsible activities have more to do with generating long-term value. In this case, 
entrenchment is initially dedicated to generating value through the implementation of 
CSR activities. This is why we have called this entrenchment a good-type entrenchment. 
With regard to internal governance mechanisms, it is worth mentioning the 
relevant role played by independent board members in the external control model in 
order to enhance financial performance. In the internal control model, the separation 
between the CEO and the chairman of the board, as well as the existence of result-based 
incentive schemes, all have a positive influence on the Tobin’s q. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have studied in what circumstances the implementation of 
entrenchment strategies has a positive effect on the generation of value. We have argued 
that the combination of entrenchment with corporate social responsible (CSR) activities 
is positive in a context of external control mechanisms, while it is negative when the 
corporate control mechanisms are internal. 
A contingency approach was adopted in order to study of the relationship 
between entrenchment and CSR. The basic premise of this approach is that the role 
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played by CSR is determined by the type of pressure applied to management: CSR may 
be either an investment strategy with long-term results or an entrenchment strategy. 
The pivotal element in determining the role played by CSR is the realization that 
management may be subject to shareholder control, both externally (through capital 
markets) or internally (through the board or through the activity of other interest groups 
such as workers or banks). The possible capacity for control of all of these groups- 
including shareholders- depends on the institutional context in which the company 
operates (La Porta et al., 1998). There are thus two institutional contexts analyzed in the 
current study: the Anglo-Saxon and the Continental European. The first of these 
contexts covers countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom and is 
characterized by the defense of shareholders’ interests (particularly those of minority 
shareholders). The second institutional context provides greater protection for interest 
groups and is characteristic of countries such as Germany, Japan and the rest of Europe. 
At the same time, it is important to emphasize that the protection that favors some 
interest groups over others has consequences in terms of company governance. For this 
reason, Schneper and Guillén (2004) speak of governance models directed towards 
shareholders and models directed towards group interests. 
In the Anglo-Saxon model directed towards shareholders, hostile takeover bids 
play a fundamental part in regulating management performance. Yet at the same time, 
the pressure applied by capital markets to achieve short-term results leads to a myopic 
perspective amongst managers; in extreme situations, this may cause the company to 
neglect long-term investments of greater actual net worth and to instead favor projects 
with a shorter recovery time. For this reason, managers’ ability to isolate from external 
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takeover threads may have favorable effects on company’s investment policy. In this 
study we analyze one of these long-term investment decisions: investments in corporate 
social responsibility. That is, we take this type of investment to be a proxy of the 
implementation of a long-term strategy by entrenched managers. The empirical 
evidence obtained here thus suggests that those managers who end up entrenched (as a 
result of the use of anti-takeover measures, limits on shareholder voting rights, the issue 
of numerous types of shares with different voting rights, or management tenure) have 
the sufficient freedom to undertake projects related to improving relationships with 
interest groups such as consumers, providers, workers, communities and 
environmentalists. Although, in the short- term, the capital market does not positively 
value such investments in social activities, the results presented in this study allow us to 
affirm that such investments ends up having a positive influence on company’s market 
value (as measured by the Tobin q). Hence, such managerial entrenchment combined 
with the implementation of CSR policies indicates that when managers adopt a long-
term strategic perspective in their investment decisions, they end up generating value. 
This is the “good-type” of entrenchment. 
In other institutional contexts, managerial entrenchment is unambiguously 
negative and the implementation of CSR policies reinforces such perverse effects of 
entrenchment on financial performance. In particular, this situation occurs when the 
market for external corporate control plays a secondary role and the internal control 
mechanisms-such as ownership concentration- are very relevant. In this context, the 
presence of blockholders that have inside information allows them to discriminate good 
from bad managers and decisions to remove managers will not be based on isolated 
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short-term financial results. This is particularly the case when the presence of 
blockholders is accompanied by different internal control mechanisms such as 
independent members on the board of directors, the non-CEO duality, and/or the 
existence of subcommittees on the board (of auditing, remuneration and nomination). In 
this context, managerial entrenchment policies are unambiguously negative and a 
manager who seeks to remain in charge, and who is immune to the pressure from the 
capital markets, may need to reinforce his position against other internal control 
mechanism by colluding with other members inside the firm.  A possible strategy is to 
seek out support among the interest groups. These groups are capable of developing 
activist strategies that end up being of influence in the running of the company. A 
manager may thus organize collusion between interest groups as a way of neutralizing 
pressure from internal control mechanisms; this collusion takes the form of numerous 
transfers to the workers and other interest groups covered by the concept of CSR. As 
such, investment in socially responsible activities becomes, in this context, part of an 
entrenchment strategy. Finally, as indicated by the obtained results, this policy of 
transfers towards interest groups has a negative effect on financial performance. 
Implications 
The central result in this paper is that managerial entrenchment is good when 
combined with CSR policies in a context of external corporate control mechanisms 
(something commonplace in Anglo-Saxon countries). In this case, management 
entrenchment has beneficial effects for the shareholder by providing company 
investment policy with a more long-term perspective. Isolated from the short-term focus 
of capital market, the manager is free to make whichever investment decision that may 
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best serve his long-term particular interests. Obviously, the particular interests that arise 
from CSR practices can be divided into two groups: private benefits obtained by better 
relationships with interest groups and greater remuneration obtained when social 
investments improve financial results. Then an efficient incentive scheme is essential 
for eliminating the risk of private benefit extraction that would lead to an excessively 
generous policy of social concessions and, presumably, would be contrary to sound 
investment policy. It is for this reason that management salaries based on a company’s 
financial results constitute a counterpoint that has important benefits for efficiency. 
The second implication of this paper is that attempts to satisfy the interests of 
different interest groups may have negative consequences for results when these 
attempts are part of an entrenchment strategy. As aforementioned, giving management 
carte blanche to determine the company social policy does not seem to be good policy 
as this may only end up becoming another aspect of entrenchment. This is particularly 
apparent in those institutional contexts in which interest groups have enough power to 
influence company governance. Moreover, the results presented in this article appear to 
suggest that the presence of internal control mechanisms -which are apparently 
efficient- is not sufficient guarantee that CSR will be properly employed by 
management. In this context, the question to be asked is ‘How can we resolve this 
problem? One possibility is to regulate CSR in order to avoid overinvestment. Without 
doubt, a first step in this direction would be accounting practices that would oblige these 
issues to be reflected in the company’s public accounts. A second solution to prevent 
problems of entrenchment might be to transfer part of the ownership to such groups. As 
company shareholders these interest groups will then internalize the costs of an 
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entrenchment strategy based on CSR. It is paradoxical that the best protection of 
shareholders’ interests may lie in transferring stake to other interest groups.  
 Future Research 
A possible extension of the work presented here would consist of analyzing 
specific dimensions of CSR with the aim of determining which interest groups would be 
most relevant in order to reinforce the positive aspects of managerial entrenchment (in a 
external corporate control framework) or the negative ones (in an internal corporate 
control framework). Another possible extension would consist of in-depth research on 
the connection between ownership structures and the causes that lead to entrenchment. 
The type of shareholder and his/her social sensibility might foreseeably have an 
important affect upon the reaction of interest groups towards management use of 
entrenchment strategies with social ends. Finally, we posit the idea that other variables 
such as a firm’s age are relevant in determining whether managerial entrenchment and 
its connection to CSR is positive or negative. Young firms need to be flexible enough to 
undertake the kind of firm specific investments -like those related to CSR- which are 
necessary to ensure their growth. For these firms, the implementation of managerial 
entrenchment measures in a context of high external pressure would be a particularly 
effective way to reinforce the CSR-type of investment that creates value. On the other 
hand, for mature firms, in which stakeholders have developed their own private 
benefits, external pressure is particularly positive. CSR policies that favor stakeholders’ 
interests, as well as managerial entrenchment, hinder external pressure and consequently 
have negative consequences for financial performance. The investigation of these issues 
is left for future research. 
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TABLE 1  
Patterns of Control: the Continental Model and the Anglo-Saxon Model. 
 Continental model Anglo-Saxon model 
   
• Standard countries within the model • Germany and Japan. • The United States and the United Kingdom 
• Type of  control • Leading shareholders. 
• Mixed stockholdings and pyramidal 
structures. 
• Capital Market. 
• Ownership structure and type of shareholder • Concentrated. 
• Companies,families,banks. 
• Dispersed. 
• Individual investors and institutions (funds). 
• Capital market • Less importance due to limited liquidity and 
transparency 
• Elevated liquidity and informative 
transparency. 
• Role of takeover bids • Very limited. • Important. 
• Role of administration board • Distinction between management and 
supervision. 
• Efficient management control mechanism. 
• Management incentives and salaries • Basically fixed and based on accounting 
indicators. 
• Light-weight stock options. 
• Important weighting of the variable, linked 
to the market. 
• Wide use of stock options. 
• Guidance in company law • Protection for creditors. • Protection for shareholders against 
management. 
• Protection for workers • In Germany, they form part of the 
supervisory board. 
• They are not considered. 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Full Sample Anglo-Saxon Model Continental Model 
Variable n Mean s.d. Minimum Maximum Mean s.d. Mean s.d. 
          
CSR 766 47.33 15.44 6.12 79.09 46.25 14.70 48.40 16.09 
Tobin’s q (log) 846 -0.79 0.44 -3.05 1.55 -0.79 0.46 -0.78 0.42 
ROA 969 4.14 12.25 -207.47 45.80 4.23 15.98 4.04 6.76 
Managerial entrenchment 644 1.34 0.70 0.00 4.00 1.31 0.58 1.36 0.80 
Anti-takeover devices 644 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.44 0.50 0.48 0.50 
Voting rights amendments 644 0.75 0.43 0.00 1.00 0.90 0.31 0.61 0.49 
Dual-class shares 644 0.93 0.26 0.00 1.00 0.92 0.28 0.94 0.23 
Managerial ownership 969 3.16 13.34 0.00 100.00 2.03 9.57 4.29 16.17 
Managerial tenure 644 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.64 0.48 0.39 0.49 
Board subcommittees 644 1.83 1.35 0.00 3.00 1.95 1.41 1.71 1.27 
CEO’s non-duality 644 0.60 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.48 0.50 0.73 0.45 
Board independence 644 0.85 0.34 0.00 1.00 0.85 0.32 0.84 0.35 
Performance evaluation 644 0.35 0.49 -1.00 1.00 0.53 0.52 0.18 0.40 
State ownership 969 1.96 8.12 0.00 89.65 0.05 1.02 3.85 11.10 
Ownership concentration 969 26.50 21.12 0.00 100.00 23.42 17.41 29.55 23.89 
Leverage 948 110.77 147.29 -932.67 974.68 101.13 150.06 120.14 144.10 
Dividends 819 9.9E+05 2.8E+06 -4.1E+07 2.2E+07 1.1E+06 3.2E+06 9.0E+05 2.3E+06 
Size 969 1.6E+07 2.9E+07 3.2E+04 3.9E+08 1.7E+07 3.5E+07 1.4E+07 2.3E+07 
Age 969 69.57 44.37 1.00 339.00 64.26 38.21 74.85 49.21 
Capital intensity 969 0.58 0.20 0.01 0.99 0.62 0.21 0.54 0.19 
Growth 969 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00 0.18 0.38 0.16 0.37 
Intangibles 899 0.32 0.25 0.00 0.95 0.35 0.26 0.29 0.24 
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TABLE 3 
Pearson’s Correlations 
a
 
 Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1. CSR                     
2. Tobin’s q (log) .06                    
3. Managerial entrenchment .13 –.05                   
4. Anti-takeover devices .21 .01 .43                  
5. Voting rights amendments .12 .06 .42 .07                 
6. Dual-class shares .06 .00 .42 –.07 .04                
7. Managerial ownership .16 .02 –.16 –.01 .01 –.09               
8. Managerial tenure –.09 –.07 .36 –.31 –.05 .12 .02              
9. Board subcommittees –.24 –.08 .01 –.32 –.01 .01 –.05 .29             
10. CEO’s non-duality –.08 –.01 –.13 –.05 –.05 –.08 –.04 –.17 –.07            
11. Board independence .04 –.06 .07 –.03 .00 .13 –.03 .04 –.04 .10           
12. Performance evaluation –.24 –.03 .03 –.24 –.04 .05 –.01 .23 .42 –.08 –.02          
13. State ownership .09 .02 –.13 .08 –.10 –.03 –.01 –.15 –.09 –.03 –.01 –.01         
14. Ownership concentration .04 .06 –.10 .00 –.06 .07 .16 .12 .06 .04 .01 .09 .02        
15. Leverage –.11 –.04 –.15 .05 .06 –.09 .05 –.24 –.03 .02 –.08 –.09 –.05 .05       
16. Dividends –.33 –.11 .06 –.09 –.12 .15 –.05 .23 .23 –.25 .03 .22 .03 –.05 –.09      
17. Size –.33 –.02 –.03 –.03 –.08 .09 –.08 .04 .19 –.18 .03 .16 .01 .02 .29 .60     
18. Age –.18 –.02 –.07 .01 .06 .00 –.04 –.08 –.02 –.07 –.04 –.03 –.10 –.04 .12 .04 .04    
19. Capital intensity .01 .04 .05 .06 –.02 –.05 –.01 .01 –.07 –.08 –.09 .01 .03 –.11 –.10 .02 –.14 –.11   
20. Growth .06 .03 –.06 –.06 .12 –.05 .12 –.16 –.02 –.05 –.06 –.04 –.19 –.07 .04 –.04 –.03 .11 –.05  
21. Intangibles .38 .17 .01 .01 .06 .02 .08 –.01 .03 –.04 –.01 .01 .09 .07 –.13 –.15 –.18 –.13 –.07 .01 
a
 Correlations above .1 are significant at p < .1. 
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TABLE 4 
Results of Regression Models for Predicting CSR: Effects of Managerial 
Entrenchment 
 Anglo-Saxon Model Continental Model 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Entrenchment Measures     
Anti-takeover devices 2.0774*  1.5234*  
Voting rights amendments 0.8165
†
  0.1422  
Dual-class shares 1.0107
†
  1.1444  
Managerial ownership 0.3838  0.9768*  
Managerial tenure 2.7307
†
  –0.0282  
Managerial entrenchment  1.6670*  1.6234
†
 
Internal Corporate Control 
Mechanisms 
    
Board independence –2.2944 –2.1005 2.7827 2.8643 
CEO’s non-duality –1.9069 –2.1999 –0.1136 2.0489 
Board subcommittees 1.2364 –1.0011 –1.1737 –1.3272
†
 
Performance evaluation –4.6581** –5.7189** –2.4531
†
 –2.5097
†
 
State ownership –0.1422 –0.0874 0.1238** 0.1291** 
Ownership concentration 0.0256 0.0655 –0.0236 –0.0173 
Other Controls     
Leverage 0.0069 0.0074 –0.0115* –0.0102 
ROA 0.1081 0.1390 –0.1400 –0.1706 
Dividends –6.5E–07** –6.9E–07** –9.9E–07** –8.7E–07** 
Growth 5.7166** 6.0794** 3.5709
†
 3.2854
†
 
Size 2.5E–08 2.4E–08 –3.74E–08 –3.91E–08 
Age –0.0008 –0.0040 –0.0183 –0.0158 
Capital intensity –0.2236 –2.54E–01 –0.6150 –0.3346 
Intangibles 10.1257** 9.8826** 10.0797** 10.7614** 
Intercept 9.7219
†
 14.1756*** 5.6346 4.3988 
     
R2 58.55 55.74 49.51 48.06 
F 5.86** 6.35** 4.90** 5.59** 
n 140 140 163 163 
 
†
 p ≤ .10 
* p ≤ .05 
** p ≤ .01
 
 43 
 
 
TABLE 5 
Results of Regression Models for Predicting Tobin’s q: Effects of CSR and 
Managerial Entrenchment 
 Anglo-Saxon Model Continental Model 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 
   
Managerial entrenchment –0.0716* –0.1355** 
CSR 0.0360 –0.0078 
CSR × Managerial entrenchment 0.6889* –0.0772* 
Internal Corporate Control Mechanisms   
Board independence 0.9753
†
 0.1672 
CEO’s non-duality 0.8159 0.5853
†
 
Board subcommittees 0.0756 0.0111 
Performance evaluation 0.0620 0.1318* 
State ownership –0.0447
†
 –0.0012 
Ownership concentration –0.0088 –0.0003 
Other Controls   
Leverage –0.0015 –0.0006* 
ROA 0.0214 0.0116** 
Dividends 1.58E–07† 2.56E–08* 
Growth 0.4361 –0.0719 
Size –2.78E–09 –3.46E–09* 
Age –0.0007 –0.0007 
Capital intensity –0.0098 0.1145* 
Intangibles 0.1992 0.0757 
Intercept –1.1613 –0.1268 
   
R
2
 18.96 31.58 
F 3.02** 2.66** 
n 140 163 
 
† p ≤ .10 
* p ≤ .05 
** p ≤ .01
 
